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The Intergovernmental Conference that has drafted the Treaty of Amsterdam has 
been unable to agree on a substantial reform of the comitology system. 
Declaration N. 30, adopted in the framework of the Final Act of the conference, 
simply invites the Commission to submit by the end of 1998 a proposal to amend 
the framework decision of 13 July 1987, laying down the procedures for the 
exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission. 1 
Discussion of comitology' s legal status is by no means a new feature of 
the European institutional debate. A shift of emphasis, however, has occurred in 
recent years. For about three decades discussion focused on demarcation of the 
respective competences of the Council and Commission in the implementation of 
"primary" Community legislation and on comitology' s role in the basic 
institutional balance established by the EC Treaty.2 In this earlier period, 
efficiency concerns were regularly voiced. Inter-institutional quarrels as to which 
procedure was to be chosen were thought to be the source of considerable delay 
in the legislative phase, leading the Commission to make cornitology one of its 
main battle-horses in the years of the internal market programme.3 More recently, 
the legitimacy of comitology has come to the fore as a major issue. Even since 
the European Parliament gained greater legislative power at Maastricht, it has 
challenged comitology as incompatible with its new institutional role stressing 
inter alia the undemocratic character of a system in which obscure committees, 
primarily composed of national bureaucrats, play a central role in the rule-making 
process.4 Moreover, the BSE crisis revealed the risk of committee "capture" by 
specific interests. 
The purpose of this paper is not to explore in detail the various legal 
problems surrounding comitology. Rather, adopting a broader perspective, it will 
try to identify the structural causes that explain the shift from efficiency to 
1 OIL 197/33 of 18 July 1987. 
2 Case 25170, Koster, [1970] ECR 116. See Bluman (1988) "Le pouvoir executif de la 
Connnission ala lumiere de l'Acte unique europeen", RTDE, 24, 27. 
3 Ehlermann (1987) "The Internal Market following the Single European Act", CML Rev, 
24, 361-404. 
4 Bradley (1997) "The European Parliament and comitology: On the Road to Nowhere?", 
EU, 3, 3, 230; Bluman (1996) "Le Parlement europeen et la comitologie : une complication 
pour la Conference intergouvernementale de 1996", RTDE, 32, 1-24. 
l ·t· cy concerns in discussions on comitology and consider vatious ways of eg1 una . . . . 
enhancing comitology' s legitimacy. W~le my comm~nts Will be _co~fin~d to 
comitology proper, i.e. the web of committees that assist the Commission m the 
implementation of Community legislation, some of the ideas discussed in the 
following pages could probably be of use for other types of committees that 
operate at European level. 
Regulation by Committees: Institutional Discourse and Realities 
Comitology, like any form of governance, must be analyzed in light of the 
functional reasons that have underpinned its development. Like much modern 
legislation, Community legislative rules are often incomplete. The reasons for 
this are manifold. The complexity of the Community legislative process makes it 
unwise to try to decide ori everything at the legislative stage -- even assuming 
that this would be possible, which is not always the case. It may also be more 
expedient politically to defer contentious items to a subsequent stage of the 
policy process. Last but not least, the technical character of the issues addressed 
may require a further input from scientific experts. A similar need may also arise 
when basic rules must be adapted to changing conditions, a common situation in 
an era of rapid technological change. Community legislation must therefore often 
be supplemented or updated by secondary rules. In addition, in some areas, the 
actual application of Community rules may require centralized decisions: this is 
notably the case when Community funds are distributed (e.g. in the framework of 
research and development programmes) and when producers seek a European 
authorization for their products, as is now possible in relation to certain kinds of 
pharmaceuticals. 5 
Although Article 155 of the EC Treaty provided from the outset that the 
Commission could be entrusted with implementation powers, it was soon 
perceived that committees, mostly composed of national experts, were necessary 
to assist the Commission in this task. This innovation was dictated not only by 
national governments' wish to keep an eye on the Commission, but also by the 
technical character of many decisions. The Commission can only count on a 
small staff -- roughly equivalent in numbers to that of a middle-sized European 
city -- and therefore does not always have the expertise needed to dispose of the 
thousands of issues delegated to it. 
5 Council Regulation (EEC) r\ 0 2309/93 of 22 July 1993, laying down Community 
procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and 
veterinary use and establishing a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, 
OJL214/l of August 1993. 
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All these elements are reviewed here simply to stress that comitology, 
which has at times been depicted as a kind of institutional hydra, is to a large 
extent a natural development. Any system of two-tiered govemment, particularly 
when it opts for decentralized implementation of rules adopted at central level, as 
has been the case in the European Community, will be inclined to develop 
structures of this kind, as can be seen in the emergence of "executive federalism" 
in Canada6 or of "Politikverflechtung" in Germany.7 
This notwithstanding, the institutional discourse on comitology has been 
rather conflictual, particularly after the Single European Act. The Commission 
has made no mystery of the fact that it regards the most restrictive forms of 
committee control -- in particular the contre-filet variant of the 1987 framework 
decision -- as an excessive intrusion into its powers, which could hamper the 
adoption of implementing measures or even affect the legislative process. ~e 
Single Act's failure to simplify comitology procedures was one of the mam 
reasons for the Commission's initial reservations conceming that treaty8. Up to 
the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission kept insisting on the necessity of a 
significant overhaul of Community procedures. 
However, the Commission's choice of comitology procedure in its 
legislative proposals is often in contrast with its public rhetoric. While it has 
repeatedly blamed the Council for ignoring the Single European Act's preference 
for the advisory committee procedure in the intemal market sector9, the 
Commission appears to bear part of the responsibility, as it has proposed other 
procedures in over 25% of the relevant cases. 10 Likewise, in spite of its declared 
aversion for regulatory committees, the Commission itself proposed almost 40% 
of the regulatory committee procedures enacted by the Council in the period 
between July 1987 and July 1995. 11 Apparently, institutional concerns play less 
of a role than official statements would suggest. The Commission is frequently 
prepared to compromise on comitology procedures, if this will obtain the 
Council's agreement on delegation of implementation powers. 
6 Smiley (1980) Canadian in Question: Federalism in the Eighties, Toronto, Me Graw 
Hill. 
7 Scharpf, Reissert and Schnabel, "Politik Verflechtung: Theorie und Empirie des 
Kooperatives Foderalismus in der BRD", Kronberg, Scriptor, 1976. 
8 Ehlermann, supra note 3. 
9 See e.g. its communication of 10 January 1991, SEC(90) 2589 final, 7. 
10 Dogan (1997) "Comitology: Little Procedures with Big Implications", West European 
Politics, 20,31-60, at 44-45. 
II Ibid. 
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This pragmatism may be explained by the consensual nature of the 
co]Jll.1littees' work. The available data suggest a rather smooth exercise, where 
acute conflicts are a rare event. Indeed, out of the thousands of decisions taken 
by the Commission in co-operation with committees in the years 1993 to 1995, in 
only six cases did the Council intervene because of disagreement between the 
Commission and the relevant committees. 12 Moreover, the accounts of committee 
members suggest that votes tend to be a rare event, and that the Commission, 
which chairs these meetings, exerts considerable influence over the committees' 
work. 
Undoubtedly, the smooth functioning of comitology proceedings is 
positive for decision-making efficiency. However, it does not follow that this will 
necessarily strengthen the overall legitimacy of the system, as shall now be seen. 
The Legitimacy of Comitology Procedures 
Comitology' s legitimacy is not merely a normative issue: it is likely to become a 
political problem of growing importance as a result of the evolution of 
Community regulatory activities. The Maastricht ratification debates have made 
it plain that large segments of the European populace do not recognize the 
legitimacy of European policy-making processes. So far, discussion on how to 
improve the legitimacy of European institutions has essentially focused on the 
powers of the European Parliament. Legislative procedures, however, are but one 
part (admittedly important) of the decision-making process. Now that the 
legislative framework for the internal market is nearly complete, there seems to 
be a slow down in the Community's legislative activities. Figure 1 shows that the 
number of primary legislative proposals has declined in recent years. 
12 Reinforcing Political Union and Preparing for Enlargement, Commission Opinion for 
the Intergovernmental Conference 1996, 1995. 
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It would be wrong to conclude from this that the overall volume of Community 
regulatory activity is declining. Indeed, the overall volume of Commission rule-
making, most of which takes place in the cornitology framework, seems to be 
increasing, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
The Commission has long been - and by far - the main producer of 
Community regulations. Moreover, in 1997, the number of directives adopted by 
the Commission exceeded for the first time that of directives adopted by the 
Council. 
The combination of these two trends -- the decline of purely legislative 
activity, and the growth of secondary rule-making -- suggest that a growing 
number of salient political issues are likely to arise in the post-legislative phase, 
be it in rule-making or the concrete application of Community rules. Should a 
given product be authorized? What kind of precautionary measures are needed to 
protect human health in the case of scientific doubts related to our alimentary 
habits? The management phase may gain even more importance in the future, as 
the Amsterdam Treaty has enhanced the powers of the European Community to 
deal with what is known as "risk regulation" in areas such as human health, 
consumer policy and environmental protection. 13 As risk regulation decisions are 
often made on the basis of complex scientific evidence, they cannot always, or 
indeed most of the time, be made in abstracto, once and for all, in legislation, but 
rather require individual, ad hoc decisions, taken by administrative bodies. 
13 Dehousse ( 1998) "European Institutional Architecture after Amsterdam: Parliamentary 
System or Regulatory Structure?" CML Rev; Ludlow (1997) Preparing Europe for the 21st 
Century: The Amsterdam Council and Beyond, Brussels, CEPS. 
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If this analysis is correct, committees are likely to be the forum for a 
growing number of important decisions at European level in the years to come. 
However, the way they operate may be a source of a variety of legitimacy 
problems. First, the system is striking in its opacity. Who does what and how is 
nearly impossible to tell for a lay audience. This lack of transparency may 
undermine the authority of Community decisions: citizens may find it difficult to 
accept decisions based on recommendations fron obscure bodies, the 
composition and functioning of which remain a mystery. Secondly, it is not clear 
that the social prestige of committee members will be sufficient to command 
obedience. While scientific experts may derive some authority from their 
technical knowledge, bureaucrats are the focus of widespread mistrust in 
European countries. Thirdly, the little we know of the way comitology works 
may also become a source of concern. The convergence of concerns, interests 
and language among experts which is said to be the hallmark of comitology 
seems to enable the system to operate fairly smoothly. 14 However, while positive 
from the standpoint of efficiency, this consensus may undermine the legitimacy 
of the system, as it can easily be depicted as one more instance of power in the 
hands of a closed circle of elites. The risk of collusion is quite real: can experts 
be regarded as neutral in areas where research is largely financed by industry? 
Can we really assume that they will not be influenced by their national origins? 
The BSE crisis has shown that issues of this kind are far from moot. They must 
therefore be addressed squarely if one is to put comitology on firmer grounds for 
legitimacy purposes. 
How may this objective be achieved? Generally speaking, five different 
types of arguments are traditionally used to legitimize bureaucratic processes. 15 
Given the specificity of the Community regulatory process, it would be wrong to 
assume that they can be mechanically transposed to the European level. 
However, they furnish good yardsticks for assessing the legitimacy of 
bureaucratic decisions taken at that leveL 
.. The "legislative mandate" approach is the most traditional. Parliament is seen 
as the main repository of legitimacy and the administration must strive to 
achieve the objectives that are set out in governing legislation. 
.. In the "accountability or control" model, legitimacy is grounded in the fact 
that the administration is somehow under control, i.e. that it is held accountable 
for its decisions by a representative body (generally the legislature) or by courts. 
14 Joerges and Neyer (1997) "From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political 
Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology", EU, 3,3, 255-272. 
15 I am using here in a slightly adapted fashion a terminology borrowed from Baldwin 
(1995) Rules and Government, Oxford, Clarendon Press at 41-5. 
9 
• The "expertise" claim stresses that as a result of their technical character 
many decisions cannot be taken by the legislature: expert judgement is needed t~ 
judge the respective merits of competing options, and experts must be granted 
sufficient discretion. 
• The "procedural" approach emphasizes the fairness of decision-making 
processes. It de~a~ds t~at con~i?eration be given to the interests of persons 
affected by admimstrative dectswns. Procedures designed to associate such 
persons to the decisi?n-making process are therefore viewed as essential. They 
tend to vary accordmg to the kind of decisions that are taken. Under "due 
process" requirements, administrative bodies must consider the interests affected 
by individual decisions. As regards rule-making, the same concern for fairness 
may lead to the adoption of rules guaranteeing transparency and participation or 
consultation rights. 
• Effici~ncy is also ofte~ .claimed as a grounds for legitimacy, particularly in 
recent times, as the abthty of government structures to deliver results is 
be~o~ng increasingly important. While there are many ways of defining 
efftc.tency, .t':o meanings are particularly relevant for our purposes: decision-
m~ng eff~ctency (the ability to take decisions when needed) and substantive 
efftctency, I.e. the ability to take the "right" decisions. 
Obv~~usly, these approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
Acco~nta~iltty and control can be used to monitor the effective implementation 
of legtslattve mandates or the compliance with the procedural requirements of 
the. ':due process" model. Likewise, the resort to experts is often advocated on 
efftct~ncy grounds, and can be balanced through various accountability 
techmques. Nevertheless, there are clear differences among various claims. The 
degree of discretion required in the "expertise" model is at odds with the idea of 
~xhausti~e legi,~lati~e ~andates. Similarly, the vision of the public interest 
mherent m the legtslattve mandate" approach often assumes the existence of a 
collective body - the people - whose interests are represented by Parliament 
w~le t?e "p~ocedural" model is informed by a more polycentric vision of th~ 
P?hty, m whtch the coexistence of a wide variety of interests, which must all be 
gtven due consideration, is acknowledged. . 
10 
( 
At this stage, my concern is not to endorse any one of these models, but 
rather to discover how suitable they may be, given the specific character of 
Community decision-making. To streamline somewhat the discussion, I will take 
as a starting point the limits of an approach that would rest exclusively on the 
"expertise" model. Involving experts at various levels of the decision-making 
process is undoubtedly necessary, particularly when the decisions to be taken 
have a sizable technical content, as is often the case at the European level. ~ 
Providing much-needed expertise is clearly an important achievement of the 1 
European committee system. It can even be argued that the quality of I 
deliberations among experts will not only contribute to the quality of the I 
regulatory process, but also to its legitimacy, as was suggested by Joerges and J 
Neyer. 16 Yet, granting experts "carte blanche" is likely to be unpopular in a -.1 
period of widespread mistrust of technocrats of all kinds. Right or wrong, lay 
people may also have views on the decisions to be taken, and insist that they too 
should be considered. ' · 
Our reflections should therefore focus on the remaining approaches. 
Various versions of the "legislative mandate" and the "accountability" models 
have been invoked by those who argue that the European Parliament, now that it 
has acquired the status of a co-legislator in many areas, should have more power 
over delegated legislation. Both types of arguments are part of the same, 
supranational avenue: the European Parliament, it is said, being the institution 
most representative of the European people at large, should play a greater role in 
overseeing comitology. In contrast, as was just indicated, the procedural model 
rests on a radically different vision of legitimacy, one which would require the 
opening of comitology to representatives of all interests affected by its decisions. 
Each of these two options will now be reviewed in turn. 
The Supranational A venue: Legislative Mandates and Parliamentary 
Control 
Since the introduction of codecision in 1993, the European Parliament has 
insisted on being treated as a Council co-equal in supervising Commission 
implementing decisions. It has opposed particularly vigorously management and 
regulatory committees, which it regards as a way of circumventing its newly 
acquired legislative powers: in the four years since codecision was introduced, 
comitology was an issue in about two-thirds of the dossiers that were subjected 
to the conciliation procedure. Disagreement over the proper implementing 
procedure was also at the root of Parliament's rejection of the directive on voice 
telephony -- the first time that Parliament used its codecision prerogatives to 
16 See their contribution cited supra note 14. 
11 
reject a Council common position. 
There are several ways in which the European Parliament could become 
more closely involved with the decisions currently being taken within the 
comitology framework. The first, "legislative mandate", approach would suggest 
that the current balance between legislation and administrative decisions be 
altered in order to ensure that the most salient policy decisions are taken as 
legislative measures. A return to legislative policymaking is a technique widely 
advocated in order to combat the growing influence of bureaucracies. 17 Surely, it 
would be historically incorrect to describe comitology as having robbed the 
European Parliament of its legislative prerogatives, as comitology predates 
Parliament's rise to the status of a full-fledged legislature. However, MEPs have 
consistently called for a clearer demarcation between decisions that can be taken 
through comitology and those that require a proper legislative procedure, 18 a 
position that underlies Parliament's support for a clear hierarchy of Community 
acts. The European Court of Justice itself has suggested that "the basic elements 
of the matter to be dealt with" must be adopted in accordance with the legislative 
procedure laid down by the Treaty, while "the provisions implementing the basic 
regulations" may be adopted according to a different (i.e. comitology) 
19 procedure. 
However, there seem to be clear functional limits to what can be achieved 
along these lines. As indicated above, it is not always possible for legislation to 
anticipate all the problems that may arise in the implementation phase. 
Parliaments may lack the time or the necessary expertise to solve all problems in 
advance, and they may find it expedient to delegate part of the problem-solving 
task to implementing agencies. Moreover, the borderline between policy choices 
and implementation "details", between legislation and administration, is often 
blurred when scientific or technical choices must be made. Prior to the BSE 
crisis, who would have thought that animal feed was an issue that would gain 
considerable public attention? 
Parliamentary control over the executive, another traditional oversight 
instrument seems equally difficult to adapt to the specific features of Community 
governance. While at national level, parliamentary control over the 
administration is a by-product of its control over the cabinet via the institution of 
ministerial responsibility, no such thing exists at European level. Parliament has 
gained considerable control over the Commission in the post-Maastricht years, 
but, of course, formally comitology committees are not under the Commission's 
17 Lowi (1979) The End of Liberalism, second edition, New York, Norton. 
18 Bradley, supra note 4, at 234. 
19 Case 25/70, Koster, [1970] ECR 1161. 
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authority. The vertical chain of command thought to exist at national level 
(parliament-executive-bureaucracy) is broken at European level, where 
delegated legislation is, at least partly, in the hands of networks of national 
experts. The European Parliament's role must be adapted to this network-based 
reality if it is to be of more than symbolic relevance. 
Parliament's response to that structural difficulty has been to put pressure 
on the Commission, as the later plays a leading role in implementation 
procedures, and appears to be extremely influential in comitology committees. 
The Plumb-Delors agreement of 1987 stipulated that the Parliament would be 
notified by the Commission of most draft implementing measures. These were 
then to be forwarded to the responsible parliamentary committee so that it could 
voice its concerns whenever necessary. Clearly, the effectiveness of such an 
agreement depends primarily on the Commission's willingness to keep the 
Parliament informed and to take its views into account. In both respects, the first 
years of the agreement have been rather disappointing: many drafts have not 
been sent to the Parliament and, in all but a handful of cases, parliamentary 
committees have failed to react.20 The strengthening of Parliament's grip over 
the Commission in the post-Maastricht years leaves room for hope that its access 
to comitology materials will improve. Even if this were to occur, however, a 
question would still remain: how should Parliament process this information, 
and react if need be? Here, two problems must be addressed: lack of time and 
expertise. Can Parliament effectively scrutinize the hundreds of decisions 
adopted each year by committees, given its heavy agenda and complex 
organization? Will MEPs have the relevant expertise? 
Entrusting supervision to Parliamentary committees, decided in the wake 
of the Plumb-Delors agreement, is a sound division of labour. Members of 
committees are likely to be better equipped than many of their colleagues to 
make sense of the technical issues addressed in draft implementing measures; 
further, decentralization is needed to deal with the masses of documents 
involved. But what kind of relationship should be established between 
Parliamentary committees and their counterpart(s) in the web of Comitology 
committees? 
Interestingly, Parliament's ambitions seem to have increased in parallel 
with the emergence of its legislative profile. Parliament has at times expressed 
an interest in being more closely involved with the work of committees, e.g. by 
including its own observers in the committees.Z1 This proposal raises a delicate 
20 Bradley, supra note 4 at 237; Corbett et al. (1995) The European Parliament, 3'd ed., 
London, Caterrnill at 254-5. 
21 Bradley, supra note 4 at 234. 
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but fundamental issue: in a system where influence appears to be directly related 
to the degree of expertise enjoyed by the various participants in the debate,22 
what can be the impact of elected representatives, namely politicians? True, the 
European Parliament could set up its own expert networks to control the work of 
committees. But in terms of legitimacy, the "value-added" of another layer of 
experts would be rather thin. Rather than have politicians clothe themselves as 
technical experts, as they at times seem tempted to do,23 would it not be 
preferable to limit their role to a number of basic policy choices and to grant 
them the right to intervene when issues they deem fundamental arise in the 
implementation phase? Indeed, Parliament's most recent thinking seems to 
favour an improvement of the Modus Vivendi signed in 1994 with the Council. 
Rather than systematically participating in the adoption of implementing 
legislation, it would be given the right (on a par with the Council, one can 
assume) to step in whenever it feels a political input is needed. 24 
Admittedly, such a division of labour would better correspond to the 
respective functions of legislator and executive in modem societies. Of particular 
importance, given the technical character of many issues tackled within 
European committees, is the Parliament's power to hold hearings. This technique 
could be used more systematically, as a means of obtaining independent 
expertise and facilitating a dialogue with interested parties. It would also enable 
the Parliament to exert greater control over the Commission, as the latter would 
be called upon to react to the views expressed by witnesses. Furthermore, 
hearings would very likely attract media attention to particular issues, thereby 
contributing to improved public awareness of the decisions taken at the 
European level. Such an approach, which emphasizes accountability and the 
European Parliament's function as a forum where the important political issues 
of the day can be debated, would be better suited both to the structure of 
comitology as a system of regulatory networks, and to the technical character of 
the issues tackled through comitology, than parliamentary involvement in the 
day-to-day work of committees. 
But would enhanced monitoring by a supranational legislature suffice as a 
grounds for legitimacy? There are reasons to be sceptical. Representative 
democracy has become the focus of widespread criticism in Western Europe, 
where it is often perceived as a system that enables a cartel of elites to exert tight 
22 See the analysis of Eichener (1992) Social Dumping or Innovative Regulation? Process 
and Outcomes of European Decision-Making in the Sector of Health and Safety at Work 
Harmonization, Florence: European University Institute, EUI Working Papers SPS 92/28. 
23 Landfried (1997), 'Beyond Technocratic Governance: The Case of Biotechnology', EU 
3, 3, 253-72. 
24 Bradley, supra note 4, at 253. 
14 
control over the policy agenda.25 Arguably, the gap between the rulers and the 
ruled may be even wider at the Community level. To many European citizens, 
the Parliament still appears a remote assembly, whose work remains largely 
unknown and whose members do not always represent the mood of the populace. 
More importantly, in a system where primary allegiances remain firmly rooted at 
the national level, national ties may prove to be more important than the 
supranational logic of parliamentary democracy. To put the matter bluntly, 
German or Danish consumers might feel more effectively represented by, say, a 
delegate from a national consumer organization involved in committee 
proceedings, than by a similar association of Greek or Portuguese MEPs. 
Reflections on the legitimacy of the European policy process must also 
come to terms with the polycentric character of the European populace. Not only 
is there no European "demos",26 but "we the people" cannot simply be read in 
the plural as a reflection of the coexistence of different states within the 
European Union. The truth is that the peoples of the Member States, too, are a 
kaleidoscope of regions, cultures and interests not always identified with the 
state apparatus, and can all legitimately claim to voice their views and be heard 
at the European level. After all, even at national level, the reductive nature of 
representative democracy, distorted even further by the structure of many 
electoral systems, makes it impossible for parliaments to mirror perfectly the 
broad range of interests and feelings that coexist within a single polity. Hence 
the attractiveness of alternative forms of legitimation, which provide for some 
form of direct participation of affected parties in the decision-making process. 
The Transnational A venue: Transparency, Openness and Proceduralization 
So far, I have argued that several of the approaches traditionally used in order to 
legitimate delegated legislation are ill-adapted to the specific needs of 
comitology. Reliance on the expertise model is no longer sufficient in a world 
where technocracy has become the focus of much criticism. Legislative 
mandates cannot always sufficiently clear, as it is impossible to consistently set 
down precise standards and objectives. Although more promising, the 
accountability claim remains elusive, as Parliamentary control over comitology 
decisions are still far from effective. Additional techniques ought therefore to be 
considered if the legitimacy of comitology is to be put on firmer ground. 
25 Meny (1998) The People, The Elites and the Populist Challenge, EUI Florence, Jean 
Monnet Chair Papers RSC no 98/47. 
26 Weiler (1995) "Does Europe need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos and the 
German Maastricht Decision", EU, 1, 3. 
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Bearing in mind what has just been said about the growing gap between 
citizens and government in Europe, one such technique might be to empower all 
the parties affected by comitology decisions to express their concerns before the 
relevant committees. The main advantages of such an approach would be 
twofold. An extensive dialogue with the various segments of civil society would 
obviate some of the shortcomings of representative democracy at the European 
level.Z7 It might also improve public awareness of the issues discussed at the 
European level, thereby contributing to the emergence of a truly pan-European 
public sphere. 
From the standpoint of openness to the populace at large, the present 
situation is defective in several respects. As any scholar who has done research 
on comitology knows, information on the actual operation of committees is 
difficult to find. The total number of committees remains a mystery28. In 1994, 
Parliament had to freeze a share of the appropriations for committees in order to 
obtain more information from the Commission on the number of meetings and 
their work product.29 Committees' rules of procedure are difficult to get hold of. 
When formal rules do exist, they appear to focus on the internal operation of 
committees: regulating deliberation among experts, i.e. relationships between the 
Commission and national representatives, is their main target.30 In contrast, little 
or no attention is paid to the relationship between the comitology web and the 
outside world. Provisions on the consultation of affected parties are striking in 
their absence. True, in some areas, committees have been created specifically for 
the purpose of allowing organized interests to give their imput. In the food 
sector, for instance, an ad hoc committee has been set up to represent the views 
of various socio-economic interests. Yet the Advisory Committee on Foodstuffs 
offers a good illustration of the limits of what have been achieved so far. 31 As its 
members are appointed by the Commission, the latter may privilege certain 
27 See Curtin (1998) "Civil Society and the European Union: Opening Spaces for 
Deliberative Democracy", forthcoming in Collected Courses of the Academy of European 
Law. 
28 See e.g. Vos (1997) "The Rise of Committees", EU 3, 3, 210 at 213; Falke, 
"Cornitology and Other Committees: A preliminary Empirical Assessment" in R.H. 
PendleriG.F. Schaefer (eds) (1996) Shaping European Law and Policy: The Role of 
Committees and Comitology in the Political Process, Maastricht, 117-65, at 136-137. 
29 Bradley, supra note 4, at 242. 
30 See e.g. the rules procedure of the standing committee for foodstuffs, a consolidated 
version of which has been prepared by the Commission (doc. ill I 3939 I 93 831 260 /90-EN 
of 11 May 1993). 
31 Commission Decision 75/420/EEC of 26 June 1975, OJ L 182/35 of 17 July 1975; 
amended by Commission decision 78/758/EEC, OJ L 251/18 of 14 September 1978. See the 
analysis of Vos (1997) "Institutional Frameworks of Community Health and Safety 
Regolation: Committees, Agencies and Private Bodies", PhD Thesis, Florence, at 152-4. 
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interests; for instance representatives of environmental interests have been 
excluded. Moreover, the committee can only act at the Commission's request, 
which explains why it has remained inactive for long periods. 
Rather than ad hoc representative fora, greater openness in the work of all 
committees is needed. This could be achieved with a standard set of procedural 
rules regulating the interface between comitology committe~s and .civil socie~ at 
large.32 What kind of principles should these rules contam? Wtth.out entenng 
into a detailed examination of the question, it may be useful to pomt out some 
basic elements. Thus, for instance, the agenda of committee mee~inf3s, the draft 
proposals to be discussed, and the minutes should be ~ad~ pubhc. In~erested 
persons should be given the opportunity to express the1r vtews on any tte_m on 
the agenda; public hearings could even be envisaged for matters of ?artlc~lar 
importance. Committees should also be required to explain the cons1derat10ns 
that underly their eventual choices. 
A procedural approach of this nature, with its participatory ethos, would 
bolster the legitimacy of comitology. It should not however be. seen as an 
alternative to parliamentary control. On the contrary, procedurahzat10n, b~~ause 
it would foster public debate, might significantly reinforce the acc?untability of 
committees vis-a-vis the European Parliament, provided the latter 1s granted the 
power to review comitology decisions. One can imagine, for instance, that if a 
committee were to overlook the concerns of, say, consumer groups, Parliament 
might be interested in knowing why. In this case, procedural and accountability 
concerns, far from being at odds with one another, would actually be mutually 
reinforcing. 
How could such a proceduralization be brought about? A number of 
scholars have warned against the danger of "ossification" of administrative 
procedures through codification in a legislative act.34 It is fair to say th~t both the 
European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance have dtsplaye~ a 
growing awareness of the necessity to protect "process" rights such as th~ nght 
to be heard and the duty to state reasons, when individual rights are drrectly 
32 This would not prevent the Community legislator to foresee exceptions for some kinds 
of decisions: standard rules would apply only in the absence of specific procedural provJswns 
in Community primary legislation. . . 
33 This could be achieved by exploiting the potential of Internet. See m this respect the 
proposals put forward by Joseph Weiler (1997) "The European Union belongs to its citizens: 
three immodest proposals", ELRev., 22, 150, 153. 
34 Schwarze (1992) European Administrative Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell; Harlow 
(1996) "Codification of EC administrative procedures? fitting the foot to the shoe or the shoe 
to the foot", EU, 2, 1, 3-25. 
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affected by Community decisions.35 However, the approach contemplated here is 
less defensive. It is not motivated as much by a concern for individual rights as 
by a desire to ensure greater openness and more public participation in 
committee decision-making. Court decisions are necessarily ad hoc, rendered in 
concrete cases; they are therefore not the best avenue for injecting new 
principles into decision-making processes. Moreover, the overall object of the 
exercise should not be forgotten. What matters for legitimacy purposes is not 
only that justice be done, but also that it be seen to be done. Put together, these 
considerations point in the same direction: the best way to introduce the 
principles discussed here would be through a framework act that would be 
adopted in the most solemn (visible) of manners and that apply to all committee 
proceedings. 
The Need for a "Soft" Proceduralization 
Turning now to the kind of procedural requirements that should be imposed on 
committees, it should be kept in mind that procedural requirements traditionally 
carry a twofold risk: that of imposing undue expense on rule-makers by 
encouraging legalism, and that of opening up the door to forms of aggressive 
judicial review, which may ultimately lead to judicial discretion replacing that of 
the administration. 
The American experience is quite telling in this respect. The US 
Administrative Procedure Act provisions on rule-making are quite general. 
Agencies are obliged to give notice that they are contemplating new rules, 
provide an opportunity for the public to comment on draft rules, and furnish a 
statement of purpose with the final rule. These minimal requirements were not 
adopted with a view to curtailing agencies' discretion; courts were merely 
allowed to strike down rules that were "arbitrary and capricious". Yet, on the 
basis of these few provisions, some courts of appeal have radically transformed 
the rule-making process. 36 Agencies have been ordered to engage a structured 
dialogue with interested parties, a dialogue which must be documented in rule-
making records. Statements of basis and purpose have been used by courts to 
35 See e.g. cases C-269/90 Hauptzollamt Miinchen v. Technische Universitat Miinchen, 
[1991] ECR I-5469; T-364/94, France Aviation v. Commission [1995] ECR ll-2845 and the 
comments by Nehl (1997) Procedures Principles of Good Administration in Community Law, 
LLM Thesis, Florence, European University Institute. 
36 See in general Stewart (1975) ''The Transformation of American Administrative Law" 
Harvard Law Review, 88, 667-813; Shapiro (1988) Who Guards the Guardians: Judicial 
Control of Administration, University of Georgia Press. 
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control both the quality of the dialogue and the reasons given by agencies, so 
that 
"[f]ar from having to demonstrate only that it has not been arbitrary and capricious, 
the agency must persuade the court that it has made the best rule that it possibly 
could."37 
This evolution illustrates the fact that the borderline between procedure 
and substance is a thin one. Hence the question: by regulating the interface 
between comitology and interested parties, are we not opening the door to the 
legalization of comitology proceedings, leading to the development of 
adversarial proceedings within committees and judicial interference with 
committee choices? Will the development of legal disputes, some of which 
might simply serve the dilatory aims of adverse parties, not hamper decision-
making? 
Clearly, this prospect is alarming for the Union. Because of its nature as a 
consensus-based system, comitology would be likely to suffer even more than 
American regulatory agencies from excessive legalization since consensus-
building among the experts would become more difficult. The increase in 
transaction costs might ultimately threaten the overall efficiency of the system. 
Thus, in the name of legitimacy, one would compromise the system's ability to 
deliver good rules within reasonable time spans. That would be paradoxical, as 
the legitimacy of modem governance is as much a matter of outputs as of 
inputs.38 
However, how real is the risk? 
First of all, procedural rules of the kind contemplated above, rules that 
would require greater openness and transparency in committee proceedings, 
essentially provide for a wider variety of inputs before decisions are made. 
Decisions, however, would still be taken by committee members and therefore 
the quality of discussion among experts, which is said to be one of comitology' s 
positive achievements, should not change dramatically. Secondly, the emphasis 
should be strictly on procedures, and judicial review of the merits of comitology 
decisions should be excluded. Clauses that might be perceived by courts as an 
invitation to engage in substantive scrutiny -- such as the clause on "arbitrary 
37 Shapiro (1996) "Codification of Administrative Law: The US and the Union", EU, 2, 
26-47 at 39. 
38 See Scharpf (1988) "Democratic Policy in Europe", EU, 2,2, 136-55. 
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and capricious" rules in the US Administrative Procedure Act -- should therefore 
be avoided.39 
True, the American example has shown that the legalization of rule-
making is more a product of judicial behaviour than of formal requirements. 
Courts may, if they so wish, exploit even the most lenient requirements to justify 
more aggressive scrutiny. At the European level, therefore, the real question is 
whether the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance are likely 
to follow the path of their US counterparts and use procedural requirements to 
monitor more closely the substance of comitology decisions. Although it is 
impossible to give a clear-cut reply, some points are worth mentioning. 
First, would committees be exposed to judicial censure if they failed to 
comply with procedural requirements? The difficulty here stems from the fact 
that comitology committees do not formally decide but merely adopt an opinion 
which conditions the Commission's margin of manoeuver. Thus, presently, the 
only act against which an appeal could be lodged would be the Commission's 
ultimate decision. However, recent developments in Community case law 
suggest that Community courts may be willing to accept that procedural flaws at 
earlier stages of an administrative proceeding, be it at national40 or at 
Community level,41 can lead to the annulment of the Commission's final 
decision. In Technische Universitat Munchen, the University of Munich, which 
had applied for an exemption from customs duties on the import of an electron 
microscope, had not been given the opportunity to submit observations to the 
group of experts advising the Commission on the existence of an equivalent 
apparatus within the Community. Although the technical debate occurred, by the 
Commission's own admission, exclusively within the expert group42 the Court of 
Justice considered that procedural flaws at earlier stages of the procedure could 
somehow be imputed to the Commission.43 The Court held that, although the 
applicable regulation did not provide for such a hearing, "the person concerned 
39 Interestingly, even in the United States, some scholars have advocated a retreat from 
'arbitrary and capricious' review and greater deference to agency decisions. See Pierce (1996) 
"The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Administrative Procedure Act: Past and Prologue 
Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act", Tulsa Law Journal, 32, 185 at 200 and 
the comments by Francesca Bignami, "Reforming European Community Rulemaking: A 
Proposal for a Modified Version of American Notice and Comment in Implementing Rules 
and Standards", European University Institute, 1998 at 98-9. 
4° Case T-364/94, France Aviation v. Commission, supra note 35. 
41 Case C-269/90, Hauptzollamt Munchen-Mitte v. Technische Universitiit Munchen, supra 
note 34. 
42 The Commission had indeed admitted that it always followed the opinions of the group 
of experts. See recital 21. 
43 Nehl, supra note 35 at 108. 
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should be able, during the actual procedure before the Commission, to put his 
own case and properly make his views known on the relevant circumstances a~d, 
where necessary, on the documents taken into account by the Commumty 
institution .. .''44 Thus, if comitology procedures were to be codified, a similar 
reasoning might lead the Court to annul Commission decisions on the basis of 
procedural irregularities in cormnittee deliberations. 
Does it automatically follow that one would run the risk of unwanted 
judicial interference? This seems rather doubtful in the present circumstances. 
The ECJ has become a rather heterogeneous body. Not only are all nationalities 
of the Union represented therein, but judges are characterized by a wide array of 
professional backgrounds and (one might assume, given the way they are 
appointed) political preferences. This, combined with the consensual character of 
decision-making, renders judicial activism less probable than with smaller, more 
homogeneous courts, where judges' preferences can more easily find their way 
into decisions. Secondly, the European Court of Justice has displayed a clear 
reluctance to censure the policy choices made by the political institutions, 
particularly in areas where they enjoy discretionary po_wers.45 This is _no~ to say 
that the Court will never annul decisions of the Council or the Comrmsswn, but 
rather that as a rule, when it does so, its rulings appear more inspired by 
procedural considerations than by substantive concerns. This long-standing 
d . 46 tendency has become, if anything, even more accentuate m recent years, 
leading occasionally to criticism of the Court for its unwillingness to question 
choices made by Community institutions.47 The Court's jurisprudence on 
subsidiarit/8 and that of the Court of First Instance on access to documents held 
44 Case C-269/90, supra note 35 at para. 25, my underlining. 
45 This tendency has been quite strong in the Court's case-law on proportionality. In a case 
which concerned inter alia a decision of a management committee, the ECJ stressed that: 
"as the evaluation of a complex economic situation is involved, the Commission and the 
Management Committee enjoy, in this respect, a wide measure of discretion. In reviewing the 
legality of the exercise of such discretion, the Court must confine itself to examining whether 
it contains a manifest error or constitutes a misuse of power or whether the authonty did not 
clearly exceed the bounds of its discretion." (case 29177, Raquette v. France, [1977] ECR 
2545, recital43). 
46 See Dehousse (1998) The European Court of Justice: The Politics of Judicial 
Integration, Paris, Montchretien. 
47 See for instance the "banana" case (Gemwny v. Council, [1994] ECR I-4973) and the 
discussion in Everling (1997) "Will Europe Slip on Bananas? The Bananas Judgement of the 
Court of Justice and National Courts", CML Review, 33, 401-37. 
48 See e.g. Case C-233/94, Germany v. Parliament and Council, [1997] ECR I-2405. For a 
more general discussion, see de Burca (1998) "The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of 
Justice as an Institutional Actor", Journal of Common Market Studies, 36, 1. 
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by Community institutions49 give evidence of their reluctance to transform 
procedural requirements into an instrument of substantive review. Given this 
background, it would be somewhat surprising to see the Court engage in detailed 
scrutiny of committees decisions or even to impose an exacting dialogue with 
private interests. 
Admittedly, proceduralization puts a premium on organizational and legal 
resources, which are unevenly dist1ibuted.50 This, however, should not be 
viewed as a decisive argument against more openness. Under the present system, 
characterized as we saw by the opacity and lack of accountability of comitology 
proceedings, "strong" interests already have access to information and are able to 
influence decision-makers, be they members of parliaments or bureaucrats, at 
national or European level. 51 It is unlikely that the adoption of procedural rules 
would exclusively or indeed mainly favor such interests. At the same time, 
however, positive measures aimed at improving representation of diffuse 
interests, are needed to prevent proceduralization from being a mere "trompe 
l'oeil" and to ensure that it actually benefits European citizens at large. 
Conclusion: Comitology Paradoxes 
Comitology is a world of paradoxes. While it appears to be growing both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, comitology often is ignored in discussions on 
the legitimacy of European policy-making, still heavily focused on legislative 
procedures. The debate among the Council, Commission and Parliament on the 
proper role of committees is often conflictual; yet the day-to-day work of 
committees seems rather consensual. Notwithstanding a widespread 
disenchantment with the way the European policy process operates, each 
institution continues to seek to maximize its own influence. All appear relatively 
unconcerned with creating channels through which European citizens may voice 
more directly their views. 
This contlibution has pleaded for a radically different approach to 
comitology reform, in which interested citizens would be given a say in 
committee deliberations. Yet, the procedural avenue outlined here, with its 
emphasis on transparency and openness, should not be seen as an alternative to 
the political control exercized by the Council and the European Parliament. On 
49 Cases T-194/94, John Carvel and Guardian v. Council, [1995] ECR ll-2765, T-105/95, 
WWFv.Commission, [1997] ECR ll-313. 
50 Stewart (1990) "Madison's Nightmares", Chicago Law Review, 57,335-56 at 346. 
51 Mazey and Richardson (eds) (1993) Lobbying in the European Community, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
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the contrary, the emergence of a public debate on committee decisions might 
reinforce political control, thereby contributing to the emergence of a 
transnational public sphere. 
Can enhanced legitimacy be obtained without at the same time threatening 
the efficiency of the present system? To be sure, this is a formidable problem. 
The proceduralization of committee work carries a twofold risk of excessive 
legalization and judicial interference. I have tlied to show that given the gre~t 
heterogeneity of the Community, the risk of judicial activism is less acute than m 
other systems. This is not to say that the problem should be overlooked. On the 
contrary, a systematic survey of means of avoiding these two evils should be 
undertaken. The purpose of legal procedures should be to ensure the fairness of 
the decision-making process, not paralyze it, nor serve as a Trojan horse for 
judicial policy-making. At the same time, in view of the widening gap between 
citizens and representative institutions, it is counterproductive to use dangers of 
that kind as a scarecrow in support of the status quo. 
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